Dela Fuente DBA SM Seafood Products v. Gimenez (2021)
See: Original Decision
Dela Fuente DBA SM Seafood Products v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 214419, 17 November 2021, Per Zalameda, J.:
1. Background
• On 06 October 2005, respondent Marilyn E. Gimenez (Gimenez) filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, nonpayment of holiday pay, premium pay for rest day, night shift, service incentive leave, separation pay and backwages against petitioners SM Seafood Products (SSP), its owner Salvador dela Fuente (dela Fuente), and SSP’s manager Manuel Sarraga (Sarraga).
• Gimenez claimed that she started working as a sorter of crab meat for SSP, a sole proprietorship engaged in exporting processed crab meat, on 12 November 2000. She averred that: (1) work begins at 8:00 a.m. and continues until 10:00 p.m., at the earliest, or 12:00 midnight, at the latest; (2) lunch break lasts about an hour or less; and (3) if there is an overtime, dinner break is from 15 to 30 minutes only.
• Sometime in 2002, satellite plants were opened in Igbon, Iloilo City and Tiglawigan, Cadiz City. Sorters and other workers, including Gimenez, were assigned to these satellite plants on a rotation basis lasting for a period of two weeks. In 2004, two other plants were opened in Gindakpan, Bohol and Hinigaran, Negros Occidental; in 2005, another plant was opened in Catbalogan, Samar. By then, the rotation assignment lasted a month at a time.
• Gimenez alleged that she and her co-workers were not furnished copies of their pay slips. Instead, they were made to sign blank papers acknowledging receipt of salary. They were even required to sign a payroll in blank and other blank papers every year and at other times. She also claimed that work would be rendered even during holidays, except during Christmas Day, New Year, All Saints Day, and Good Friday. On Holy Thursday, the Madridejos fiesta, they were required to work for half a day. However, they did not receive holiday pay for work rendered on those days. Gimenez also averred that the 13th month pay she and her co-workers received was less than the legally mandated rate. Their employer also never paid them at the legally mandated minimum wage. A sorter like her received a wage of Php150.00 per day and a worker assigned outside Madridejos, Cebu received an additional allowance, from 2002 to 2003, of Php60.00 per day. Thereafter, the allowance was increased to Php80.00 per day.
• According to Gimenez, she was suspended illegally in at least three (3) instances.
• In 2002, Gimenez was assigned at Igbon Island, Iloilo. One day, she and two other sorters stopped to have lunch at around 1:45 p.m. Sarraga berated them, telling them that they should have finished their work before eating. Even as they explained that dela Fuente had given them permission to stop and eat so long as the crab meat was covered in ice, Sarraga nonetheless suspended them for two (2) weeks. They were not given notice or hearing before their suspension.
• Gimenez further averred that every year on December 08, the main feast in Madridejos, Cebu, they would be required to render half-day work, which would start at 4:00 p.m. instead of 8:00 a.m., and would last until 12:00 midnight. On 07 December 2003, Sarraga held a meeting with the workers emphasizing that those who would be absent on 08 December 2003 would be suspended. Gimenez arrived late on said day because the first trip of the first passenger vehicle from Bantayan, which would usually leave at 6:30 a.m., was delayed. Despite her pleas for understanding, Sarraga still suspended her for two (2) weeks.
• From 18 May to 18 June 2005, Gimenez was assigned at the Masbate plant. On June 18, she was informed that she had to report to Bantayan on June 19 and immediately started her work. On June 22, while at the Madridejos plant, she was instructed to report to Igbon, Iloilo on June 23. She pleaded to be allowed to report to Iloilo on June 26 instead so that she could attend the burial of her cousin on June 25. On June 23, the workers at the Madridejos plant were given cash advances. Gimenez’s cash advance amounted to P4,500.00. On June 25, she attended the burial of her cousin. When she returned to work, she asked her supervisor about her Iloilo assignment. She was informed, however, that Sarraga had suspended her for two months due to her refusal to be assigned to Iloilo. Not having received any notice or hearing on the suspension, Gimenez inquired from Sarraga if she was indeed suspended, which the latter confirmed. She accepted the suspension and bided time until her return to work on 25 August 2005.
• In the meantime, on 14 August 2005, Gimenez met some of her co-workers by chance and they inquired if she was returning for work because petitioners had required them to pay for her cash advance. It had been standard practice by SSP that once the cash advance of a worker was required to be paid by his or her co-workers, that worker was deemed terminated. When she sought confirmation, Sarraga informed her that she was, indeed, terminated because, according to her co-worker Melissa Rubio, Gimenez’s children did not like her being assigned to other plants outside Madridejos. Gimenez refuted this and told Sarraga that she wanted to continue working. Sarraga agreed to reinstate her on the condition that she pay her cash advance in full. When Gimenez explained that she could not pay without being reinstated, and could only do so through salary deductions, Sarraga refused to reinstate her. She was not paid her P150.00 per day salary from 19 to 23 June 2005, and her P80.00/day allowance for 2 days for being assigned outside Madridejos. Hence, she filed the complaint.
• In their defense, petitioners denied that Gimenez was illegally suspended or that she was illegally dismissed. Dela Fuente maintained that he did not authorize anyone, even Sarraga, to suspend or dismiss Gimenez. In fact, Sarraga can only recommend action but cannot suspend or dismiss employees. He claimed that Gimenez had been absent from work without notice or permission since 24 June 2005. Later, Dela Fuente discovered a resignation letter dated 23 June 2005 signed by Gimenez.
• Upon receiving a copy of the complaint, Dela Fuente inquired from Gimenez what happened and she merely replied that she was very sorry. When she was asked to return back to work, Gimenez said she was ashamed to report back to work. Dela Fuente further alleged that despite the irregularity of supplies and delivery, Gimenez and her co-workers would be paid their daily wage and allowance. In fact, workers are paid P163.00 per 8-hour work day regardless of whether they work the full eight (8) hours, plus P80.00 daily allowance. Dela Fuente claimed that he has paid all salaries and wages due to Gimenez; thus, she had no more claims against him. He also averred that due to the numerous vouchers/payrolls duly signed by Gimenez, only representative payrolls for the months of April 2005 until 23 June 2005 could be presented.
• As proof, petitioners submitted the aforementioned resignation letter and a Quitclaim and Release (quitclaim) both dated 23 June 2005 signed by Gimenez. The latter, however, insisted that she did not sign said documents and that the same were probably obtained by using the blank documents SSP’s employees were made to sign.
2. SC Decision / Resolution
⦁ [S]ettled is the rule that the employer has the burden of proving, in illegal dismissal cases, that the employee was dismissed for a just or authorized cause. Even if the employer claims that the employee resigned, the employer still has the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary. Further, the evidence thereon must be clear, positive, and convincing. The employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.
⦁ In the instant case, Gimenez specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of the resignation letter and quitclaim she supposedly signed. Consequently, petitioners bore the burden of proving otherwise, which they utterly failed to do.
⦁ After a meticulous scrutiny of the records, We agree with the CA that the resignation letter and quitclaim are dubious, to say the least. The CA noted several peculiarities and infirmities apparent on the face of the documents:
First, the resignation letter is typewritten, while the Quitclaim is a printed document. It is disturbing to note that such a personal matter as a resignation letter, written by a penurious and uneducated person such as the petitioner, would be neatly done, without corrections, on a typewriter, an instrument which she can ill-afford or which she cannot manage. It is perturbing to note that the reason for the purported resignation coincides with the “hearsay” reason advanced by respondent Sarraga. On the other hand, the quitclaim is a pro-forma printed document.
Second, it is common practice for persons to affix their signatures at or near the last line of the printed text of the document. Petitioner must therefore be presumed to have affixed her signature in accord with common practice. The signature of the petitioner in all the documents on record, except for the questioned documents, confirms this observation. The handwritten name and signature of the petitioner in the two (2) questioned documents appear at the very bottom, of these documents, quite some distance from the last printed/typewritten word/sentence of the document. Petitioner’s signature appearing in the resignation letter is approximately four (4) inches from the last line of the typewritten text. The signature also appears at the extreme lower right corner of the paper while the typewritten words occupy about half thereof. On the other hand, petitioner’s signature in the quitclaim is about two (2) inches from the last line of the printed words. We find it quite unusual, if not contrived, for any person to affix a signature several inches away from the body of the document. At the onset, petitioner had already claimed that she was made to sign blank documents.
Third, if the body of the document is in printed form, the name of the signatory is usually printed so that the signatory will simply affix his/her signature over the printed name. In both documents, the signature of the petitioner was affixed over her handwritten name. It would appear that the name was written after the signature was already made:
Fourth, the handwritten-printed name of the petitioner in both documents appears to have been written by different persons. The handwritten names of the petitioner in the questioned documents does not contain her middle initial “E”, unlike the name she placed in the Complaint, in the verification portion of her petition, she filed before the NLRC. Moreover, the handwritten family name in the resignation letter is spelled “Giminez”, when in all the documents filed by the petitioner, she spells her family name as GIMENEZ. Who would misspell his/her name in a personal document as a resignation letter?
Fifth, and last, the quitclaim and release allegedly signed by the petitioner is in the English language which we seriously doubt is a language known to and understood by the petitioner. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner knows the English language, we seriously doubt that she could have written the same on her own. Furthermore, the quitclaim and release document states “after having been sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say that” but the document was not notarized. How could the petitioner have been sworn to in accordance with law if she did not appear before a person authorized to administer oaths and had subscribed to the said quitclaim?
⦁ With these blatant infirmities appearing on the face of the documents, we are inclined to give credence to the petitioner’s contention that she had previously signed blank papers and the respondents caused the printing of the words on these blank papers after her signature had been procured. Under such circumstances, it is therefore obvious that these documents were not voluntarily signed by the petitioner. She signed the blank papers without the intention of having the same used as a resignation letter and/or quitclaim and release. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
