Disease

1. Concept

Disease – refers to “an illness that affects a person” or “a condition that prevents the body or mind from working normally”. (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary)

a. Legal basis

1) Labor Code

Art. 284. Disease as ground for termination. – An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, a.k.a. LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)

2) Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

SECTION 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. — Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature of at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall   ask the employee to take   a   leave   of absence. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. (BOOK VI, OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR CODE, Rule I)

3) DOLE Department Order No. 147, Series of 2015

DOLE Department Order No. 147, Series of 2015, reiterates disease as an authorized for separating an employee under Section 5.4(e), Rule I-A.

2. DOLE Standards

(e) Disease. – To be a valid ground for termination, the following must be present:

The employee must be suffering from any disease;

The continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his/her health as well as to the health of his/her co-employees; and

There must be certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is incurable within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. (DOLE-BLR DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 147, SERIES OF 2015, Rule I-A)

As substantive requirements, the Labor Code and its IRR require the presence of the following elements:

1) An employee has been found to be suffering from any disease.

2) His continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health, as well as to the health of his co-employees.

3) A competent public health authority certifies that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. (Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 202996, 18 June 2014)

In a bundle of cases, [the Supreme Court has] held that for a dismissal on the ground of disease to be considered valid, two requisites must concur: (a) the employee suffers from a disease which cannot be cured within six months and his/her continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his/her health or to the health of his/her co-employees, and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a competent public health authority. (Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation v. Mesina, G.R. No. 217169, November 4, 2020, Per Hernando, J.)

Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation v. Mesina, G.R. No. 217169, November 4, 2020, Per Hernando, J.:

⦁ In the instant case, petitioners did not comply with the foregoing requirements to justify Mesina’s termination on the ground of a disease. We note that MAZCO repatriated Mesina to the Philippines without any showing that he had a prolonged and permanent disease. Furthermore, Mesina’s Medical Reports established that he was first confined on February 11, 2006 due to acute retrostemal chest pain and upon his discharge on February 14, 2006, he was “in good general condition with an advice to [undergo] a percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) for further evaluation and management”. Similarly, during his second confinement on February 18, 2006 due to left sided precordial pain on his left shoulder and forearm, his February 20, 2006 Medical Report indicated that “[t]he patient was admitted in the hospital under observation with follow up ECG & cardiac enzymes. ECG showed no new changes. The cardiac enzymes were within normal range. He was given a strong analgesic & the specific treatment & was discharged on 19.02.06 with an advice for urgent PCI for more evaluation…,”

⦁ Thus, when Mesina was repatriated on February 21, 2006, none of his medical records showed that his ailment was permanent or that he suffered from a disease which could not be cured within six months and that his continued employment was prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees. This is validated by the absence of the required Certification from a competent public authority certifying to such a health condition on his part.

a. Any disease

The Supreme Court applied this provision in resolving illegal dismissal cases due to non-contagious diseases such as stroke, heart attack, osteoarthritis, and eye cataract, among others. (Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. [2014], supra.)

Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 202996, 18 June 2014:

⦁ In Baby Bus, Inc. v. Minister of Labor, the Supreme Court upheld the labor arbitration’s finding that Jacinto Mangalino’s continued employment – after he suffered several strokes – would be prejudicial to his health. (Ibid.)

⦁ In Duterte v. Kingswood Trading Co., Inc., the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of Article 284 of the Labor Code to heart attacks. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the employer-company’s failure to present a certification from a public health authority rendered Roque Duterte’s termination due to a heart attack illegal. (Ibid.)

⦁ The Supreme Court also applied this provision in Sy v. Court of Appeals to determine whether Jaime Sahot was illegally dismissed due to various ailments such as presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy, osteoarthritis, and heart enlargement, among others. (Ibid.)

⦁ In Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that the employer-company’s non-presentment of a certification from a public health authority with respect to Romualdo Payong Jr.’s eye cataract was fatal to its defense. (Ibid.)

b. Prohibited by law or prejudicial to his/her health or his/her co-employees

With respect to the first and second elements, the Supreme Court liberally construed the phrase “prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees” to mean “prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees.” The Supreme Court did not limit the scope of this phrase to contagious diseases for the reason that this phrase is preceded by the phrase “any disease” under Article 284 of the Labor Code. (Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. [2014], supra.)

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998, Per Romero, J.:

• In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.

• Petitioner attributes good faith on the part of its principal, claiming that “It was the concern for the welfare and physical well being (sic) of private respondent that drove her employer to take the painful decision of terminating her from the service and having her repatriated to the Philippines at its expense. The employer did not want to risk the aggravation of the illness of private respondent which could have been the logical consequence were private respondent allowed to continue with her job.”

• The Court notes, however, that aside from these bare allegations, petitioner has not presented any medical certificate or similar document from a competent public health authority in support of its claims.

Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio, G.R. No. 144786, April 15, 2004, Per Callejo, SR., J.:

• In the case at bar, the petitioner did not adduce in evidence a certification from a public authority to the effect that respondent Paramio had been heavily wounded. It also failed to show that by reason of his thumb injury, he lost the ability to work. Respondent Paramio was not, for a time, able to perform the backbreaking tasks required by his manager. However, despite his injury, he managed to perform the other tasks assigned to him, including carrying of 30-kilogram containers with the exception of the work in the Lupo Department.[60] The fact that respondent Paramio was assigned to perform the second hardest and heaviest task in the company shows the heartlessness of the company’s manager. Despite his wound, the respondent tried to accomplish the work assigned to him. The least the manager should have done was to assign the respondent to a lighter task, until such time that the latter’s wound had completely healed. It must be stressed where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.

c. Certified by public health authority to be incurable within 6 months

That a person has a disease does not per se entitle the employer to terminate his or her services. Termination is the last resort. At the very least, a competent public health authority must certify that the disease cannot be cured within six (6) months, even with appropriate treatment. (Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 204944-45, December 3, 2014, Per Leonen, J.)

Without the medical certificate, there can be no authorized cause for the employee’s dismissal. (Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. [2014], supra.)

SRL International Manpower Agency v. Yarza, G.R. No. 207828, February 14, 2022, Per Hernando, J.:

• Akkila dismissed the services of Yarza on the ground of disease, which is found in Article 299 [284] of the Labor Code. The said provision essentially provides that “an employer would be authorized to terminate the services of an employee found to be suffering from any disease if the employee’s continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health or to the health of his fellow employees.”

• Akkila did not present any certification from a competent public health authority citing that Yarza’s disease cannot be cured within six months, or that his employment is prejudicial to his health or that of his co-employees. Absent this certification, Akkila failed to comply with Article 299 [284] of the Labor Code as well as Section 8, Title 1, Book Six of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. In other words, Yarza’s dismissal was not based on a just cause.

Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 202996, June 18, 2014, Per Brion, J.:

• Simply stated, this requirement is not merely a procedural requirement, but a substantive one. The certification from a competent public health authority is precisely the substantial evidence required by law to prove the existence of the disease itself, its non-curability within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment, and the prejudice that it would cause to the health of the sick employee and to those of his co-employees.

• In the current case, we agree with the CA that Dr. Lee’s psychiatric report substantially proves that Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia, that his disease was not curable within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment, and that his continued employment would be prejudicial to his mental health. This conclusion is further substantiated by the unusual and bizarre acts that Deoferio committed while at Intel’s employ.

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and, thus, defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. (Wuerth Philippines, Inc. v. Ynson, G.R. No. 175932, 15 February 2012)

The law is unequivocal: the employer, before it can legally dismiss its employee on the ground of disease, must adduce a certification from a competent public authority that the disease of which its employee is suffering is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper treatment. (Duterte v. Kingswood Trading Co., Inc., G.R. No. 160325, 04 October 2007)

3. Due Process

The Labor Code and its IRR are silent on the procedural due process required in terminations due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in the law, Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the IRR expressly states that the employee should be afforded procedural due process in all cases of dismissals. (Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. [2014], supra.)

Deoferio v. Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. [2014], supra.

⦁ In Sy v. Court of Appeals and Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr., promulgated in 2003 and 2005, respectively, the Court finally pronounced the rule that the employer must furnish the employee two written notices in terminations due to disease, namely: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the ground for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense. These rulings reinforce the State policy of protecting the workers from being terminated without cause and without affording them the opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. (Ibid.)

Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu [2014]:

• There is no evidence showing that Arlene was accorded due process. After informing her employer of her lung cancer, she was not given the chance to present medical certificates. Fuji immediately concluded that Arlene could no longer perform her duties because of chemotherapy. It did not ask her how her condition would affect her work. Neither did it suggest for her to take a leave, even though she was entitled to sick leaves. Worse, it did not present any certificate from a competent public health authority. What Fuji did was to inform her that her contract would no longer be renewed, and when she did not agree, her salary was withheld. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission that for failure of Fuji to comply with due process, Arlene was illegally dismissed.

For the authorized cause of disease, due process requires observance of the following:

1) Authorized cause: disease; and

2) Authorized cause procedure.

a. Authorized cause

The authorized cause of disease should be actual and/or duly established or proven. It should not be hypothetical or speculative.

1) No proof of financial loss required

Just like installation of labor-saving devices, the ground of redundancy does not require the exhibition of proof of losses or imminent losses. In fact, of all the statutory grounds provided in Article 283 of the Labor Code, it is only retrenchment which requires proof of losses or possible losses as justification for termination of employment. (Coats Manila Bay, Inc. v. Ortega, G.R. No. 172628, February 13, 2009, Per Tinga, J.)

b. Authorized cause procedure

If there is a good faith legitimate business reason for disease, the employer is required to comply with authorized cause procedure to comply with the due process requirements.

See: Authorized Cause Procedure

1) Separation pay

5.5 Payment of Separation Pay. Separation pay shall be paid by the employer to an employee terminated due to installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment, closure or cessation of operations not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, and disease. (DOLE-BLR DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 147, SERIES OF 2015, Rule I-A)

An employee terminated due to disease shall be paid by the employer a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or one-half (½) month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of six (6) months service is considered as one (1) whole year. (Ibid., Paragraph 5)

See: Authorized Cause Procedure | Separation Pay

c. Non-compliance of due process

Non-compliance with the authorized cause procedure requirements results in:

1) A defective termination; and

2) Nominal damages against the employer.

See: Authorized Cause Procedure

5. Burden of proof: on employer

The burden of proving compliance with these requisites is on the employer. (Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 204944-45, 03 December 2014)

The burden of proving the validity of the dismissal rests on the employer. As such, the employer must prove that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employee’s dismissal. (Manly Express Inc. v. Payong, Jr., G.R. No. 167462, 25 October 2005)