Francesca v. Sutherland Global Services, Inc. (2025)

See: Original Decision

Francesca v. Sutherland Global Services, Inc., G.R. No. 262564, August 6, 2025, Per Inting, J.:

1. Background

• On September 12, 2016, Sutherland, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of process outsourcing, hired Paulino as a Senior Training Specialist and assigned her at Sutherland’s Office in Shaw Boulevard (Shaw Office).Initially, Paulino was doing well in her job. Sutherland recognized her as the Best Trainer for the Month of May 2017 as shown by a Certificatedated June 4, 2017, and designated her as OIC-Training Manager. However, a year later, i.e., in September 2017, Paulino got pregnant with her second child. When Paulino informed the Training Manager, Jelanie Tupas (Tupas), that she was pregnant – one week later, Sutherland announced the transfer of all of its trainers to its Clark Site (Clark Office) effective October 2017.Sutherland’s Training Director, Anna Ileto (Ileto), convinced Paulino via phone conversation to accept the temporary assignment at the Clark Office where trainers were needed. Paulino, despite her pregnancy and the Clark Office being a considerable distance away from her residence in Bulacan, agreed to the new assignment as it was merely temporary. Moreover, Paulino expected, per company policy, that she would be given hotel accommodations near the Clark Office; that shuttle services would be provided; and that she would be given per diem allowance for daily expenses. However, a few hours after she consented to the transfer to the Clark Office, Sutherland informed Paulino that her assignment would be at Sutherland’s Office in Tarlac (Tarlac Office). Because of her pregnancy, Paulino became hesitant to accept the assignment, but Tupas and Ileto assured Paulino that Sutherland would provide shuttle services for her.

• In her Position Paper, Paulino alleged the following:

She complied with Sutherland’s directives and conducted training sessions at the Tarlac Office despite her sensitive condition caused by her pregnancy. She spent three and a half hours of travel every day from the Hotel in Clark to the Tarlac Office and vice versa. She experienced motion sickness due to the strenuous work Sutherland required her to do. As she could no longer continue because of her sickness, Sutherland ended the training sessions in Tarlac. Consequently, Sutherland assigned her to the Clark Office.

• Subsequently, Moussa, the Training Manager, had a one-on-one session with Paulino in the Clark Office. Moussa berated Paulino and blamed her for the dissolution of the training sessions at the Tarlac Office and described her performance as not “trainer-like.”

• Sutherland transferred Paulino to the Production Area of the Clark Office. There, she brought with her a blanket to the Production Area because it was cold and she only had limited clothing as she was merely on temporary assignment. While the trainees were entitled to a 15-minute break, she would choose to take the break inside the Production Area than to spend it at their designated sleeping quarters which were remotely located. Despite knowledge of her pregnancy, Moussa barred her from bringing a blanket in the Production Area. And for “aesthetic reasons,” Moussa likewise prevented her from bringing a bag to or taking a break at the Production Area.

• Worse, Sutherland decided to change Paulino’s assignment at the Clark Office from temporary to permanent. Sometime in December 2017, Moussa asked her if she wanted to be assigned permanently at the Clark Office. While the assignment appeared optional, Moussa clarified that if she would not accept the permanent assignment, she would be placed on a floating status indefinitely with no pay. Thus, Paulino was constrained to accept the permanent assignment. Moussa then promised to give her a relocation allowance in the first week of January, but it never materialized. On January 30, 2018, Paulino requested Moussa to extend her stay at Red Planet Hotel for just one day as she has not yet found a place to rent near the Clark Office. Moussa refused to extend Paulino’s hotel accommodation. Instead, she directed Paulino to take a forced leave.

• Following the advice of her doctor, Paulino, on February 24, 2018, filed an application for leave of absence for one week, as she was suffering from urinary tract infection. Moussa received the application; she also extended her concern of her predicament.

• On March 5, 2018, Paulino went to Sutherland to submit the Medical Certificate prepared by her doctor and SSS Form, which stated that she would be needing a 40-day rest. Despite having filed her medical leave of absence, Sutherland included her in their company’s “Absconding List,” and consequently, withheld her salary which was due on March 15, 2018.

While on preterm labor, Paulino formally brought the issue of non-payment of her salary to Sutherland’s Human Resources Team via email…

• On the last day of her maternity leave, i.e., June 28, 2018, Paulino, with the assent of Moussa, used three of her earned leaves of absence to look for a suitable babysitter. Unfortunately, after the lapse of three days, she was unable to find one. Paulino then asked Moussa for an extension of her leave of absence, but Moussa did not grant it.

• As she was unable to bring her newborn baby from her residence at Bulacan to the remote Clark Office, Paulino requested to be reassigned to the Shaw Office so she could take care of her baby. Moussa flatly rejected it and reasoned that her assignment to the Clark Office cannot be altered for one year because of the “relocation bond,” a condition which was foreign to Paulino since Sutherland never mentioned it to her. Out of frustration, Paulino asked Moussa if she should just resign because no one will take care of her newborn baby. In response, Moussa stated that Sutherland’s policy requires 30-day notice before an employee could resign, but in Paulina’s case, Moussa stated that she would immediately approve her resignation in disregard of company policy.

• This prompted Paulino to tender her resignation from Sutherland in the letter dated June 30, 2018 (resignation letter)…

• For their part, respondent et al. argued that Paulino voluntarily resigned based on her resignation letter…

2. SC Decision / Resolution

• [F]or a resignation to be considered valid, the following must concur: (1) intent to relinquish the position; and (2) the overt act of relinquishment. And because intent is a mental state, it can only be determined by observing the person’s actions. The Court must therefore examine the resignation letter in its entirety and delve into the “totality of circumstances” of the case;and it must take into consideration the actuation of the employee before and after the alleged resignation to determine if the employee truly intended to resign from their employment.

• Applied to the case, while petitioner in the first line of her resignation letter expressed her desire to immediately resign, the tenor of the succeeding 12 or more lines unmistakably show that she “was left with no option but to leave” due to pregnancy discrimination. Worse, contrary to the CA’s declaration that the resignation was unconditional, the last line of petitioner’s letter expressly stated that her resignation is “without prejudice to the appropriate legal remedies which I may resort to in accordance with law.”

• For emphasis, the complete text of the resignation letter is reproduced as follows:

Dear Ms. Aliaa Moussa:

I am writing this letter to infom1 you of my decision to resign immediately from my position as a Sr. Training Specialist at Sutherland – Clark.

I have been extremely stressed, disappointed and felt discriminated for the following reasons:

1. I was pregnant when they transferred us to Pampanga site. We were advised to train in Clark but there was a sudden notice that it will happen in Tarlac. I was left with no choice because I need to work.

2. I was pregnant when I got high fever while training in Tarlac. I was in the clinic for half day and when I went back to work, [y]ou were disappointed because I did not send my EOD report. Considering that I was pregnant and went to work with fever, I felt that I was degraded when you said that not sending the report was not a “Trainer like”.

3. I was pregnant and my hotel accommodation was to end. My accommodation was to expire on January 30. I was asked to hunt for a house on January 1. But hunting for a place became very difficult because we didn’t have the relocation allowance on hand. I asked for 1 day extension at least until January 31^st once pay roll is out but it was declined. It became very challenging to beg for your consideration knowing that I was pregnant. You wanted me to pay for the hotel bills if I will extend for just 1 day. I was offered to travel back and forth to Bulacan while waiting for my pay and I didn’t have a place to stay. I felt that it was very difficult to ask for a consideration knowing that it was never my fault that the relocation allowance hasn’t arrived yet.

4. I became part of the Absconding (inactive) list resulting for my pay to be on hold. You always tell us to check the Absconding email list to make sure that none of the active employees will become inactive but I was surprised when HR said that my profile was deactivated. I felt that you did not mind me being on the list and deactivated.

5. You called me once to tell that my medical certificate was not validated. You asked me if I went to the clinic and had my certificate validated. I told you that I sent my medical certificate thru FB and it is impossible for [me] to bring that paper to the clinic. I was crying on the phone and you said “I am not a doctor to validate your document”. That is why my leaves were not approved even if you know that my pay was on hold due to the absconding list. This is how you show you care.

6. I have been sending emails but there was this one email that you did not answer until I reached out to our Training Director. The question was from HR asking you to reply to the email. I felt that you really did not want to answer.

7. Finance promised that my pay will come out on April 30. I had dues to pay and I was compromised because my pay was still not released. I felt that they did not bother how was I able to give birth.

8. HR knew that I was on pre term labor and was no longer allowed to travel. I asked then to check the forms first while I was still in the office yet; my SSS LOA notification was declined due to a signature that was left out. How many times do I have to check the form and reiterate to them that they have to check it because I cannot travel back and forth? This put more pressure on my pregnancy.

9. I sent an email with multiple follow ups for inquiry but only the Senior Director had the guts to ask for someone to answer my questions. This is how credible the HR team was. 

10. I asked for Leave of Absence because my baby sitter surprisingly left. You said that you will check if my earned leaves can be applied on my behalf but latter it cant. So you asked me of my next plan. I requested for [LOA] while looking for a baby sitter but you said no LOA will be approved. Then I said if I can go back to my original site (Shaw). You said it won[‘]t be possible because of the Relocation bond of 1 year.

11. No one told me that [there] is a Relocation bond of 1 year. You asked me to decide urgent or else I will float without telling me that I will be required to stay in Pampanga for 1 year and no paper was signed. I felt that I was left with no option.

12. Now, since my LOA was declined, going back to my original site was no longer possible, you told me that you will no longer ask me to render. You will approve my immediate resignation.

13. This, I was left with no option but to leave. I told my Training Director that I am not yet ready to leave because I love Sutherland as a whole but Pampanga site is unique that now I am being forced to leave this good office. The sequence of events became just unbearable and inhumane. This is without prejudice to the appropriate legal remedies which I may resort to in accordance with law.^[78] (Emphasis supplied)

• Based on the full text of the resignation letter alone, it is clear that petitioner’s resignation was not voluntary.

• Respondent et al. argues that there can be no constructive dismissal for the following reasons: (1) petitioner accepted the transfers to the Clark Office and the Tarlac Office, and the transfers were an exercise of management prerogative; (2) as she retained her position, there was no demotion in rank or diminution in pay; and (3) it provided petitioner with hotel accommodations.

• Respondent et al.’s arguments are absurd.

• First, it is well to stress that employers, such as respondent, bear the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for a valid and legitimate ground; otherwise, the transfer is deemed a constructive dismissal.”

• Second, constructive dismissal or constructive discharge exists “when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as the offer of employment involves a demotion in rank or diminution in pay.” It likewise exists where “an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him [or her] except to forego his [or her] continued employment.” Stated otherwise, even without a demotion in rank or diminution in pay, there may still be constructive dismissal in cases where the employee was forced to resign because of discrimination.

• Third, the Supreme Court, as the prime duty bearer and as the last bulwark of justice and democracy, is constitutionally mandated to protect working women against all forms of discrimination and to ensure that they enjoy decent work environments, with due regard to their maternal functions.

• Article XIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states:

SECTION 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation. (Emphasis supplied)

• Additionally, Section 5(b) in relation to Section 22 of the Magna Carta of Women reads:

SECTION 5. The State as the Primary Duty-Bearer. – The State, as the primary duty-bearer, shall:
. . . .
(b) Protect women against discrimination and from violation of their rights by private corporations, entities, and individuals; and

The State shall fulfill these duties through law, policy, regulatory instruments, administrative guidelines, and other appropriate measures, including temporary special measures[.]

SECTION 22. Right to Decent Work. – The State shall progressively realize and ensure decent work standards for women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable quality in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity.

(a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are productive and fairly remunerative as family living wage, security in the workplace, and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize, participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.

(b) The State shall further ensure:

(1) Support services and gears to protect them from occupational and health hazards taking into account women’s maternal functions;

(2) Support services that will enable women to balance their family obligations and work responsibilities including, but not limited to, the establishment of day care centers and breast-feeding stations at the workplace, and providing maternity leave pursuant to the Labor Code and other pertinent laws[.] (Emphasis supplied)

• Guided by the foregoing labor principles, the Magna Carta of Women, and the 1987 Constitution, the Court finds that the CA erred in imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.

• For one, it is undisputed that respondent, one week after petitioner disclosed the fact of her pregnancy, immediately transferred her from the Shaw Office to the Clark Office; otherwise, she would be placed on a floating status, indefinitely, and without pay. To justify the transfer, respondent alleged that the re-assignment was due to the closure of ISM Shaw, and as proof, it attached an image of a purported email communication dated September 30, 2017, which stated, among others, that petitioner would be absorbed in ISM Clark.

• Unfortunately, the purported email communications cannot be relied upon for being unauthenticated and unsigned. “While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before [labor tribunals], the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value.”

• For another, when petitioner, a resident of Bulacan, agreed to the “temporary assignment” to the Clark Office, respondent et al., without any explanation, changed petitioner’s assignment to the Tarlac Office. In its Comment, respondent et al. stated that it paid for petitioner’s hotel from October 2017 to January 2018, so she did not have to travel from her residence in Bulacan to her place of work in Tarlac. Similarly, the CA, in the assailed Decision, stated that respondent et al. addressed petitioner’s pregnancy by giving her a 30-day hotel accommodation. However, it must be stressed that the hotel accommodation was at Red Planet Hotel located in Clark which meant that to report to work, petitioner, a pregnant woman, was required to travel more or less three and a half hours a day from Clark to Tarlac, and vice versa.Consequently, she got sick and was unable to finish her training sessions in Tarlac. In all the pleadings it filed, respondent et al. provided no explanation as to the following: (I) why petitioner was assigned to the Tarlac Office after their earlier agreement to assign her to the Clark Office; and (2) why petitioner was not given a hotel accommodation near the Tarlac Office but was instead lodged in a hotel located in Clark.

• Verily, the NLRC correctly ruled that respondent et al. violated Item 8.1 of its Employment Contract with petitioner, viz.:

8. Business Travel.

8.1. Your duties may require you to engage in travel on behalf of the Company including travel outside the Philippines. As a consequence, you must work any additional hours as required. You expressly agree to accept such reasonable travel and hours of work without additional compensation subject to applicable law.

• In addition, in Guinto v. Sto. Niño Long-Zeny Consignee,the rule is that “when the employer fails to specifically deny the … employee’s material averments as to the circumstances of his [or her] dismissal, the employer is deemed to have admitted the fact of dismissal and must then discharge [the] burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee was valid.” In this case, respondent et al. never denied, and in effect admitted the following: (1) the harsh conditions petitioner allegedly suffered while in the Production Area of the Clark Office during her pregnancy; (2) her unjustifiable inclusion in the Absconding List and the fact that she was unable to receive her salary for the periods before and after she gave birth, despite respondent et al.’s representations that it would be credited to her account; (3) the fact that respondent et al. never informed petitioner about the “relocation bond,” which prohibited her re-assignment to the Shaw Office for one year; and (4) that it was Moussa who suggested and triggered petitioner’s resignation.

• In Bayview Management Consultants, Inc. v. Pre,”[a]cts of disdain and hostile behavior such as demotion, uttering insulting words, asking for resignation, and apathetic conduct towards an employee constitute constructive illegal dismissal.”

• To the Court’s mind, the circumstances, taken collectively, demonstrate respondent et al.’s discrimination against petitioner on account of her pregnancy. Such discrimination constitutes not only constructive dismissal but also a violation of the Magna Carta of Women.