Resignation
1. Concept
Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office. (Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc. v. Siason, G.R. No. 215555, July 29, 2015, Per Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. (Pascua v. Bank Wise Inc., G.R. No. 191460, 31 January 2018)
In cases of voluntary resignation, the employee finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment; hence, the law affords the employee the right to resign regardless of whether the company has found an able and competent replacement and whether the operation of the company would be affected provided he serves a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. (PHIMCO Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118041, June 11, 1997, Per Bellosillo, J.)
2. Jurisprudential requisites
The following are the requisites for a valid resignation:
1) Intent to relinquish/resign; and
2) Overt act of relinquishment/resignation.
For resignation from employment to be valid, there must be an intent to relinquish the position together with the overt act of relinquishment. Resignation must be voluntary. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer, if defense of resignation is presented, must show that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. (Bance v. University of St. Anthony and Santiago Ortega, Jr., G.R. No. 202724, February 3, 2021, Per Hernando, J.)
a. Intent to relinquish/resign
Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc. v. Siason, G.R. No. 215555, July 29, 2015, Per Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
• A judicious review of the records reveals that CABI’ s accounting department indeed made an audit of the purchases made by the company through its Purchasing Officer, Siason. This resulted in the discovery of a number of questionable discrepancies in several purchasing transactions undertaken by Siason, consisting in different price quotations for identical items contained in various purchase documents prepared by Siason herself. Taking into consideration Siason’s long tenure at CABI, as well as her close relationship with Chan, the latter sent her the October 3, 2011 letter asking her to resign “rather than [to] force [his] hand”- which should be construed as Chan telling Siason to resign or be faced with an administrative complaint. On October 4, 2011, Atty. Ner-Tiangco sent Siason another letter, essentially confirming if the latter was going to resign or if she is subjecting herself to an administrative investigation. Ultimately, Siason chose to tender her resignation to save herself from the trouble of besmirching her employment record.
• The foregoing facts belie Siason’s argument that petitioners constructively dismissed her. These circumstances show that she was given the option to voluntarily resign from CABI, instead of dealing with an investigation which might result in her dismissal. Verily, Chan’s decision to give Siason a graceful exit rather than to file an action for redress is perfectly within the discretion of the former; as it is not uncommon that an employee is permitted to resign to avoid the humiliation and embarrassment of being terminated for just cause after the exposure of her malfeasance. It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter’s employment record, as in this case.
• In sum, petitioners did not constructively dismiss Siason; but rather, the latter voluntarily resigned from her job in order to avoid a full-blown administrative trial regarding her misdeeds which could potentially result in her termination for just cause. While it may be said that she did not tender her resignation wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own making did not give her any other option but to voluntarily do so. Therefore, in view of her voluntary resignation from CABI, she is not entitled to any separation pay in the absence of any agreement with petitioners providing for such.
Bance v. University of St. Anthony and Santiago Ortega, Jr., G.R. No. 202724, February 3, 2021, Per Hernando, J.:
• In the instant case, the fact of petitioners’ resignation is undisputed. Lobetania tendered her resignation on July 27, 2007, and was approved by Atty. Ortega on August 9, 2007. Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre tendered their resignation on December 22, 2007, and these were approved by Atty. Ortega on December 26, 2007. In examining the totality of circumstances, respondents showed that Lobetania, Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre voluntarily resigned prior to the effectivity date of the termination of their employment. There were ongoing investigations against petitioners for the irregular acts they committed thereby placing them in a difficult position. Moreover, from the wording of the resignation letters, it can be implied that petitioners’ resignations were voluntary. Though not the sole test, the wording of resignation letters may be considered as a factor, together with other circumstances, in assessing the voluntariness of a resignation. Also, to emphasize, petitioners did not contend or present countervailing evidence that their resignation was involuntary. Likewise, “it is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter’s employment record.”
• Thus, because of the voluntary resignations of Lobetania, Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre prior to the termination of their employment, their complaints for illegal dismissal have no basis.
See: Original Decision
b. Overt act of relinquishment/resignation
1) 30-day advance written notice
ART. 300. [285] Termination by Employee. (a) An employee may terminate without just cause the employee -employer relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. x x x (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, a.k.a. LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)
The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his employment. (Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc. v. Siason [2015], supra.)
Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81087, June 19, 1991, Per Padilla, J.:
• On 10 May 1982, private respondent Ernesto de la Cruz signed a shipboard employment contract with petitioner Troodos Shipping Company as principal and petitioner Intertrod Maritime, Inc., as agent to serve as Third Engineer on board the M/T “BREEDEN” for a period of twelve (12) months with a basic monthly salary of US$950.00.
• Private respondent eventually boarded a sister vessel, M/T “AFAMIS” and proceeded to work as the vessel’s Third Engineer under the same terms and conditions of his employment contract previously referred to.
• On 26 August 1982, while the ship (M/T “Afamis”) was at Port Pylos, Greece, private respondent requested for relief, due to “personal reason.”3 The Master of the ship approved his request but informed private respondent that repatriation expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty (30) days notice in view of the Clause 5 of the employment contract so that a replacement for him (private respondent) could be arranged.
• On 30 August 1982, while the vessel was at Port Said in Egypt and despite the fact that it was only four (4) days after private respondent’s request for relief, the Master “signed him off” and paid him in cash all amounts due him less the amount of US$780.00 for his repatriation expenses, as evidenced by the wages account signed by the private respondent.
• On his return to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board (NSB)(now POEA) charging petitioners for breach of employment contract and violation of NSB rules and regulations.6 Private respondent alleged that his request for relief was made in order to take care of a Filipino member of the crew of M/T “AFAMIS” who was hospitalized on 25 August 1982 in Athens, Greece. However, the Master of the ship refused to let him immediately disembark in Greece so that the reason for his request for relief ceased to exist. Hence, when the Master of the ship forced him to step out in Egypt despite his protestations to the contrary, there being no more reason to request for relief, an illegal dismissal occurred and he had no other recourse but to return to the Philippines at his own expense.
• In its Answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the allegations of the complainant and averred that the contract was cut short because of private respondent’s own request for relief so that it was only proper that he should pay for his repatriation expenses in accordance with the provisions of their employment contract.
• The employer has no control over resignations and so, the notification requirement was devised in order to ensure that no disruption of work would be involved by reason of the resignation. This practice has been recognized because “every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits by adopting a device or means designed towards that goal.”
• Resignations, once accepted and being the sole act of the employee, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. In the instant case, the Master had already accepted the resignation and, although the private respondent was being required to serve the thirty (30) days notice provided in the contract, his resignation was already approved. Private respondent cannot claim that his resignation ceased to be effective because he was not immediately discharged in Port Pylos, Greece, for he could no longer unilaterally withdraw such resignation. When he later signified his intention of continuing his work, it was already up to the petitioners to accept his withdrawal of his resignation. The mere fact that they did not accept such withdrawal did not constitute illegal dismissal for acceptance of the withdrawal of the resignation was their (petitioners’) sole prerogative.
• Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job.ℒαwρhi৷ It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, as in this case, the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal for the employer has the right to determine who his employees will be. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them.
• Furthermore, the employment contract also provides as follows:
4. That all terms and conditions agreed herein are for a service period of twelve (12) months provided the vessel is in a convenient port for his repatriation, otherwise at Master’s discretion, on vessel’s arrival at the first port where repatriation is practicable provided that such continued service shall not exceed three months.
• Under the terms of the employment contract, it is the ship’s Master who determines where a seaman requesting relief may be “signed off.” It is, therefore, erroneous for private respondent to claim that his resignation was effective only in Greece and that because he was not immediately allowed to disembark in Greece (as the employer wanted compliance with the contractual conditions for termination on the part of the employee), the resignation was to be deemed automatically withdrawn.
a) No specific format to notice
There is no specific format to the written notice. After the date of the document, mention of the immediate supervisor or the human resources department (depending on Company Policies), the body may simply indicate:
[Date]
Dear Sir/Ma’am,
I hereby tender my formal resignation effective 30-days after or on [indicate: last day]
(sgd.) [Employee’s Complete Name]
Then, the notice should be signed by the employee.
b) No specific wording
1) Memorandum without resignation words, deemed a resignation letter
Philippines Today, Inc. v. Go-Belmonte, G.R. No. 112965, January 30, 1997, Per Panganiban, J.:
• May a “Memorandum for File” which did not mention the words “resign” and/or “resignation” nonetheless juridically constitute voluntary resignation? In answering this question, the Court took into account not merely the literal meaning of the words and phrases used but, more importantly, the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing as well as antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions, which were inconsistent with the desire for continued employment of the writer, an intelligent executive occupying a position of trust in the Philippine Star and gifted with an unusual writing ability.
• Both the Constitution and the Labor Code mandate a bias in favor of labor. Hence, this Court , as a matter of judicial policy, leans backwards to protect labor and the working class against the machinations and incursions of their more financially entrenched employers. In the present case, however, it is obvious to us that private respondent’s memorandum could not have been intended merely to persuade management to improve the work environment at the Philippine Star. Rather, it was evidently a recitation of the facts and reasons why respondent Alegre could no longer continue working under what he believed were unbearable conditions in the work place. The offensive language used by a well-educated man endowed with unusual writing skill could not have been intended merely for the “suggestion box.” That it was addressed and given to persons of uncommon perception themselves takes the letter out of ordinary employer-employee communications. It is true that there was no direct mention of the word “resignation.” However, the incendiary words employed denote a clear intent to end the writer’s association of trust and confidence with his superiors and employer. This intent becomes even more manifest when viewed in light of attendant acts of Alegre, particularly his prolonged leave of absence, his clearing of his own desk of personal belongings, his failure to report back to work after the expiration of his approved leave, his verbal expression of his intent to resign, and most notably, his assumption of a higher paying job in a political office which was incompatible with his work at the Star. (Emphasis supplied.)
See: Original Decision | Case Digest
2) Render period
ART. 300. [285] Termination by Employee. (a) An employee may terminate without just cause the employee -employer relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages. x x x (LABOR CODE)
PHIMCO Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118041, June 11, 1997, Per Bellosillo, J.:
• RENATO CARPIO was hired by petitioner PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, Inc., on 1 April 1983 as a log and lumber grader. In 1987 he was promoted to the position of documentation assistant. In 1990 he further advanced in rank to handle the company’s export of selective lumber until he filed his letter of resignation on 14 August 1991 addressed to Mr. Lut Lopez, Assistant General Manager, Export Trading Division, PHIMCO, to take effect fifteen (15) days later or on 30 August 1991.
• The records show that during his years of service, Carpio had an excellent employment record. He was a hardworking, efficient and effective worker. He was awarded various recognitions, e.g., a certificate of recognition for perfect attendance in 1988 and service awards for dedicated and valued services to the company from 1983 to 1988.
• Carpio still reported for work even after tendering his letter of resignation up to the time the same was to take effect; in the meantime however no action was taken by petitioner with respect to his letter of resignation. It was only on 4 September 1991, in a letter dated 3 September 1991 from Francis Ferdinand C. Cinco, Human Resource Manager, that Carpio was required to explain within seven (7) days the reason for his neglect to serve an advance written notice and his failure to seek approval from his department head for a shorter notification period. At that time, he had already left for the United States. As such, he petitioned through his wife for additional time to prepare his answer. In a letter dated 12 September 1991, which was received by PHIMCO on 26 October 1991, Carpio clarified the reason for his resignation, stating that he had mentioned to Mr. Lut Lopez his plans of resigning to seek better opportunities in the United States. He also requested that he be granted his separation pay.
• On 4 November 1991 Cinco informed Carpio that he was being terminated by the company for failure to abide with the company’s rules, particularly Rules 7, 7.1 and 7.2 of the company’s Handbook, which provide thus:
Rule 7 – The resignation of any employee shall be effected only upon its proper acceptance by Management.
• We find the penalty of dismissal imposed on Carpio for non-observance of the rules and regulations provided in the Handbook of PHIMCO, particularly Rules 7, 7.1 and 7.2 concerning the resignation of the employee, too harsh. There is no dispute that Carpio failed to comply with company rules and regulations regarding his resignation. Nonetheless, it has to be noted and emphasized that he did not outrightly disregard the same. Looking back at the antecedents, it was on 14 August 1991 that he tendered his resignation to take effect fifteen (15) days later or on 30 August 1991. Before that period expired he still reported for work. Significantly, the fact that his letter of resignation was only acted upon after he had left for United States opens the avenues for speculations and suspicions. While he continued to work to await the acceptance of his resignation, he was not even informed of the status thereof or that he had to stay for fifteen (15) more days. The rule could have been easily pointed out or relayed to him by Mr. Lopez to whom he handed his letter of resignation and who was staying with him in the same office. But management waited until after he had left for the United States. Evidently, there was bad faith in the manner his resignation was resolved.
• Petitioner also avers that Carpio’s termination was for a just cause under the law grounded on his willful disobedience to comply with the company’s rules and regulation. But to constitute willful disobedience the employee’s conduct must be willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge. In the instant case, we find absent any intentional or willful conduct on the part of Carpio to disregard the rules regarding voluntary resignation. On the contrary, there was earnest and sincere effort on the part of Carpio to comply.
• In cases of voluntary resignation, the employee finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment; hence, the law affords the employee the right to resign regardless of whether the company has found an able and competent replacement and whether the operation of the company would be affected provided he serves a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. The rule of requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30-day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation becomes discretionary on the part of management as an employee who intends to resign may be allowed a shorter period before his resignation becomes effective. In the instant case, the noncompliance with the period should not be used by management as a subterfuge to avoid the payment of separation pay.
• Finally, we recognize the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules, and to assure that the same would be complied with. That notwithstanding, from the wholistic perspective, we view the resignation of Carpio as having sufficiently and substantially complied with the company’s requirement. This is not to say that we are condoning the failure of Carpio to abide by the rules. But considering his length of service and his dedicated and faithful employment in the company, the totality of his infraction simply does not justify the extreme penalty of dismissal.
• As regards the claim of Carpio for separation pay, inasmuch as we find his dismissal unjustified, necessarily some form of separation benefits is forthcoming. In affirming the award of separation pay to Carpio, no doubt the NLRC invoked Art. 283 of the Labor Code which provides that separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay, or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, and a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year. But severance pay under Art. 283 only refers to termination of employment due to retrenchment and cessation of operation not due to serious business losses or financial reverses. It does not refer to separation by reason of voluntary resignation. In fact, the rule is that an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay, except when it is stipulated in the employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by established practice or policy of the employer. Hence, in granting separation benefits to Carpio, we follow the established company policy which provides for forty percent (40%) of one (1) month basic compensation for every year of service. Under the circumstances, the award of separation pay to Carpio must be reduced.
See: Original Decision
a) Damages if 30-day notice not complied
ART. 300. [285] Termination by Employee. (a) An employee may terminate without just cause the employee -employer relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages.
(b) An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any notice on the employer for any of the following just causes:
1. Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the employee;
2. Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his representative;
3. Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the person of the employee or any of the immediate members of his family; and
4. Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing. (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, a.k.a. LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES)
The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages. (Article 300 [a], Labor Code)
The employer may file an action for damages before regular courts (MTC/RTC), and not with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
b) When 30-day notice not required
An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any notice on the employer for any of the following just causes:
1) Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the employee;
2) Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his representative;
3) Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the person of the employee or any of the immediate members of his family; and,
4) Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing. (Article 300 [b], Labor Code)
c) Shortening of 30 days to render: employer’s option
The rule of requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30-day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation becomes discretionary on the part of management as an employee who intends to resign may be allowed a shorter period before his resignation becomes effective. In the instant case, the noncompliance with the period should not be used by management as a subterfuge to avoid the payment of separation pay. (PHIMCO Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118041, June 11, 1997, Per Bellosillo, J.)
The 30-day notice requirement for an employee’s resignation is actually for the benefit of the employer who has the discretion to waive such period. Its purpose is to afford the employer enough time to hire another employee if needed and to see to it that there is proper turn-over of the tasks which the resigning employee may be handling. (Hechanova Bugay Vilchez Lawyers, Hechanova & Co., Inc. v. Matorre, G.R. No. 198261, 16 October 2013)
d) Longer period for notice and service
The employer and the employee may stipulate in the employment contract to a longer period than 30 days (e.g. 60 day, etc.) if the position is highly technical resulting in a difficulty in hiring a replacement.
3. Acceptance by employer
There is confusion on whether acceptance by the employer is required for a resignation to be effective. This is partly because resignation in the private sector is incorrectly equated to that of the Government Service which requires acceptance or approval of the resignation to be effective in the interest of public service.
In addition, there is a string of jurisprudence which appears to have be re-echoing the same despite incorrectly quoting the original source/case: Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing (1993), which did not expressly state that acceptance by the employer is required; rather, the Supreme Court was merely laying down the arguments of the Solicitor General. Unfortunately, the next case Reyes (2003) incorrectly cited such argument of the Solicitor General, resulting in the perception that acceptance is required. This is further complicated by the fact that the subsequent case was again cited by the later case of Shie Jie Corporation (2005). Details of which are discussed below.
a. Effective against the employer
“Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is necessary to make the resignation effective.” (Shie Jie Corporation v. NLRC, Francisco, G.R. No. 153148, 15 July 2005)
[T]he Court lends no evidentiary weight to the Resignation Letter since a resignation without acceptance produces no legal effect.[95] While Modair presented the Resignation Letter, it did not prove its assent thereto. Going into the substance thereof, the Resignation Letter merely informed Modair “that the undersigned will tender his voluntary resignation x x x due to career advancement[,]” without so much as a reference to his then-engagement Finally, as aptly pointed out by the NLRC, the Resignation Letter dated February 14, 2000 is contradicted by the Certificate of Employment, attesting to Carpio’s engagement from October 27, 1998 to April 10, 2013. (Carpio v. MODAIR Manila Co. Ltd., Inc., G.R. No. 239622, June 21, 2021, Per Lopez, J.)
SHIE JIE Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 153148, 15 July 2005, Per Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
⦁ [Complainants-employees] were employed as fish processors by [the employers: referring to the Company and the management representatives]. On July 20, 1998, [the employers] … confronted them about their union activities. Immediately, they were ordered to go home. The next day, [the employers] suspended them for one week effective July 22 to 28, 1998 [except complainant-Wilfredo]. Upon their return, [the employees] were served with a notice of [the employers’] memorandum terminating their services for abandonment of work.
⦁ [The employers], in their answer, denied [the employees’] allegations. [The employers] claimed that on July 20, 1998, about 2:45 o’clock in the afternoon, 13 rank-and-file employees staged a walk-out and abandoned their work. Among them were [the complainants-employees]. As a consequence, [the employers’] business operations were interrupted and paralyzed, prompting them to issue a memorandum suspending [the employees] for one week or from July 22 to 28, 1998. However, on July 24, 1998, [the employers], in another memorandum, directed them to report for work on July 27, 1998. Instead, respondents Ernesto…, Sorraya…, Yasher…, Yolanda …, Merylene…, and Wilfredo… submitted their resignation letters and quitclaims. Subsequently or on July 28, 1998, [the employers] sent [the employees] Arnold…, Nida…, Vivian…, and Manuel… a notice terminating their services for abandonment of work.
⦁ [The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employer. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of the employees. On further appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the employees.]
⦁ [Resolution: The employer was held liable.]Voluntary resignation is defined as the act of an employee, who finds himself in a situation in which he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is necessary to make the resignation effective. No such acceptance, however, was shown in the instant case.
⦁ Moreover, the fact that [the employees] immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against [the employers] and repudiated their alleged resignation completely negated [the employers’] claim that they voluntarily resigned.
⦁ In Molave Tours Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, we held:
By vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action against [the employer], [the employee] clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment, which act is wholly incompatible to petitioner’s assertion that he voluntarily resigned.
⦁ Neither do we find any indication that [the employees] have shown by some overt acts their intention to sever their employment in [the employer].
⦁ In Samarca vs. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., we ruled:
x x x. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.
x x x
Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the employee’s ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.
Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of work. x x x.
⦁ In this case, [the employees] did not report back for work on July 27, 1998 because they were suspended by [the employers] for one week effective July 22 to 28, 1998. Verily, their absence cannot be considered abandonment of work, a just cause for termination of employment.
See: Original Decision
| Editor’s Note: |
| 1) The Shie Jie Corporation case on the requirement that acceptance by the employer is necessary to effect a resignation should be read in relation to involuntary servitude under Article 1703 of the Civil Code, which reads: “No contract which practically amounts to involuntary servitude, under any guise whatsoever, shall be valid.” |
| 2) The Shie Jie Corporation case cites Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. 154448, 15 August 2003, which in turn cites Indophil Acrylic MFG Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 96488, 27 September 1993. |
| 3) However, in the progenitor case of Indophil Acrylic MFG Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court did not make the pronouncement that acceptance of the resignation letter is necessary to be effective; rather, it was an observation of the position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General. See below. |
Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. 154448, 15 August 2003, Per Ynares-Santiago, J.:
⦁ Leong Hup Poultry Farms SDN. BHD (Leung Hup) of Malaysia, thru its Managing Director Francis.., appointed [the complainant-employee] Pedrito… as Technical/Sales Manager with a net salary of US$4,500.00 a month. His duties consisted of selling parent stock day-old chicks and providing technical assistance to clients of the company in Malaysia and other Asian countries. Sometime in 1992, the company formed Philippine Malay Poultry Breeders, Inc., (Philmalay) in the Philippines. [The employee] was appointed General Manager thereof with a monthly salary of US$5,500.00.
⦁ In 1996-1997, [Leung Hup and Philmalay, collectively “the Companies”] suffered losses which caused them to reduce production and retrench employees in Philmalay. On June 30, 1997, [the employer] gave verbal notice to respondent Francis… that he will serve as General Manager of Philmalay until December 31, 1997 only. In a letter dated January 12, 1998, [the employee] confirmed his verbal notice of resignation and requested that he be given the same benefits granted to retrenched and resigned employees of the company, consisting of separation pay equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service and the monetary equivalent of his sick leave and vacation leave. He likewise requested for the following:
1. payment of underpaid salary for the period December 1989 – December 31, 1997 together with the additional one month salary payable in December of every year which was paid at the rate of P26.00 instead of the floating rate;
2. brand new car (Galant Super Saloon) or its equivalent;
3. life insurance policy in the amount of US$100,000.00 from December 1, 1989 to December 31, 1997, or the premiums due thereon;
4. office rentals at the rate of US$300.00 or its peso equivalent for the use of his residence as office of Philmalay for the period December 1, 1989 to July 1996; and
5. retention of the services of the law firm Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law Firm, which was hired by respondents to defend him in the illegal recruitment case filed against him in connection with his employment with respondents.
⦁ In a letter dated January 19, 1998, respondent Philmalay retrenched [the employee] effective January 20, 1998 and promised to pay him separation benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code. He was, however, offered a separation pay equivalent to four months only, or the total amount of P578,600.00 (P144,650 x 4). The offer was not accepted by [the employee] and efforts to settle the impasse proved futile.
⦁ [The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employee. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling with modifications. On Appeal, the employer’s petition was denied due to technicality.]
⦁ [Resolution: The employer was not held liable. The employee was validly dismissed.] The Court finds that [the employee’s] dismissal from service was due to retrenchment. This is evident from the termination letter sent by Philmalay to [the employee], to wit –
We regret to inform you that in view of the prevailing market conditions and the continuous losses being incurred by the company, the management has decided to cut down on expenses and prevent further losses through retrenchment of some of our personnel effective January 19, 1998.
In compliance with the requirement of the law, this will serve as a formal notice to you of your termination due to retrenchment effective January 20, 1998. To provide you with sufficient time to seek alternative employment, you need not report for work (unless otherwise requested) starting January 20, 1998. Notwithstanding the above mentioned affectivity date, you may come down to the office and receive your separation benefits pursuant to the Labor Code…
⦁ While it is true that [the employee] tendered his resignation letter to [the Companies] requesting that he be given the same benefits granted by the company to resigned/retrenched employees, there is no showing that [the Companies] accepted his resignation. Acceptance of a resignation tendered by an employee is necessary to make the resignation effective. No such acceptance, however, was shown in the instant case. What appears in the record is a letter terminating the services of [the employee] due to retrenchment effective January 20, 1998. Verily, said letter should be interpreted as a non-acceptance of [the employee’s] resignation effective December 31, 1997. As correctly pointed out by the Labor Arbiter, if [the Companies] considered [the employee] resigned as of December 31, 1997, then there would be no need to retrench him.
See: Original Decision
INDOPHIL Acrylic Mfg Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 96488, 27 September 1993
⦁ [The complainant-employee] was employed as Cadet Engineer by [the employer], a supervisory position, on February 14, 1989. His monthly salary was P2,050.00. On September 26, 1989, he was prevented by the company guard from entering the premises, on the ground that he has resigned. Thus, on October 4, 1989, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against [the employer] and also for non-payment of salary from September 10, 1989 up to September 25, 1989, underpayment of salary from September 1, 1989 up to September 15, 1989, and award of moral and exemplary damages.
⦁ [The employer], however, contradicts the allegations of [the employee] with respect to the circumstances which led to the severance of his employment. According to [the employer], [the employer] submitted his letter of resignation on September 14, 1989, which it accepted. On September 15, 1989, [the employee], by means of false pretenses, retrieved his letter of resignation from the office secretary and from then on, no longer reported for work. In view of said failure by [the employee] to report for work, the personnel manager of [the employer] sent him a letter dated October 2, 1989, requiring him to report and explain his unauthorized absences within three (3) days upon receipt thereof. Instead of submitting a reply thereto, [the employee] filed the present complaint.
⦁ [The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employer. On Appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of the employee.
⦁ [Resolution: The employer was not held liable. The employee’s complaint was dismissed.] The Office of the Solicitor General supports the questioned decision and resolution of public respondent [NLRC]. It maintains that [the employer] had not yet accepted the resignation of [the employee], citing the October 2, 1989 letter requiring private respondent to report for work and to explain his unauthorized absences. Another is the failure of [the employer] to present in evidence anything that will prove its allegation that the resignation of [the employee] had already been accepted (e.g., a reply acceptance letter). Thus, [the employee] could validly withdraw the same from [the employer] even without the latter’s consent. The pertinent entry in the log book of the security guard is proof that [the employee] was actually barred from entering the premises on September 26, 1989.
⦁ Neither the Labor Arbiter’s decision declaring the dismissal of [the employer] legal, on the basis of his resignation and abandonment, nor public respondent’s resolution declaring the dismissal illegal, on the allegation that [the employer] was barred from entering the premises by the company guard, is correct.
⦁ We have turned a heedful eye on all the pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties and have concluded that there was NO DISMISSAL. Setting aside the other arguments of the parties which we find irrelevant, attention is called to the letter dated October 2, 1989 of [the employer’s] Personnel Manager, Mr. Nicasio…, to [the employee] which the latter does not dispute, the full text of which reads:
“Records show that you have not been reporting to (sic) work since September 16, 1989 up to this writing. For what reason, we are not aware.
With this letter, you are required to report to this office and explain your unauthorized absences within three (3) days upon receipt hereof.
Failure to report as required shall mean that we will consider you having resigned for abandonment of job.” (sic)
⦁ Clearly, therefore, [the employer] had disregarded [the employee’s] previous resignation and still considers him its employee. It follows, that at the time [the employer] filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, on October 4, 1989, [the employer] has not dismissed him.
| Editor’s Note: |
| To harmonize the appearing conflict, it is submitted that: |
| 1) Resignation is effective as against the employer – only if the employer accepts it. |
| 2) Resignation is effective on the employee – if: |
| a) The employer accepts it; or |
| b) The conditions for the 30-day render (or higher number of days per employment contract) is met. |
| In the above scenario, the following legal basis will be harmonized: |
| 1) Full protection clause in the 1987 Constitution; |
| 2) 30-day render provision in the Labor Code; |
| 3) Involuntary servitude in the Civil Code; and |
| 4) Acceptance of resignation principles under Jurisprudence. |
| It is thus humbly submitted that the Supreme Court may look into this and hopefully have clarification on this matter via new jurisprudence. |
b. Acceptance finalizes resignation, withdrawal up to employer
Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains his job. (Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81087, 19 June 1991)
4. No separation pay
Resigning employees are not entitled to separation pay, which is due only for authorized cause separation, such as installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment, among others. In these situations, the employee is being separated from their employment through no fault of theirs rather the employer is exercising its management prerogative to let go of employees for business or economic reasons. Since it is not the fault of the employees, the employers are required to provide separation pay in order to assist the affected employees in their transition to their next gainful employment.
That is not the case at all with resigning employees. They themselves decided to willfully and voluntarily severe their employment with the Company. Thus, the separation from their employment is attributable to the employees themselves.
5. Burden of proof
When it comes to burden of proof, it shifts depending on what is at issue.
a. Fact of dismissal: on employee
Indeed, in illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer in proving the validity of dismissal. However, the fact of dismissal, if disputed, must be duly proven by the complainant. (Italkarat 18, Inc. v. Gerasmio, G.R. No. 221411, 28 September 2020)
ITALKARAT 18, Inc. v. Gerasmio, G.R. No. 221411, 28 September 2020, Per Hernando, J.:
⦁ On January 13, 2009, [the Complainant] filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, separation pay, declaration of the quitclaim and release as null and void, 13th month pay, litigation expenses, damages and attorney’s fees, against [the Company].
⦁ [The Complainant] alleged that the Company hired him on June 1, 1990. In 1993, he was designated as the Maintenance Head and Tool and Die Maker until his dismissal on November 20, 2008 on the ground of serious business losses. He claimed that during and prior to the last quarter of 2008, the Company had repeatedly informed its employees of its proposed retrenchment program because it was suffering from serious business losses. In particular, [the Complainant] claimed that [N.] San Pedro (San Pedro), the then Officer-In-Charge (OIC)/Manager of the Company, informed him sometime in November 2008 that the Company was planning to retrench a substantial number of workers in the Maintenance and Tool and Die Section; and that if he opts to retire early, he will be given a sum of P170,000.00. San Pedro then allegedly cautioned [the Complainant] that if he will not accept the offer to retire early, the Company would eventually retrench or terminate him from his employment, in which case, he might not even receive anything.
⦁ In light of the foregoing, [the Complainant] executed and signed a resignation letter and quitclaim on November 20, 2008. He was then informed to return on November 25, 2008 to get his check worth P170,000.00.10 However, to his dismay, [the Complainant] was later informed by San Pedro that he would be receiving only the amount of P26,901.34.11 Thus, [the Complainant], through his lawyer, sent a letter dated November 25, 2008, essentially demanding the amount of P170,000.00 he was allegedly promised earlier. Since the Company did not respond, [the Complainant] filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal.
⦁ On the other hand, the Company essentially alleged that [the Complainant] voluntarily resigned from his job, thus, his claims are baseless. The Company admitted that it hired [the Complainant] as maintenance personnel on December 1, 1989. It further alleged that during the last year of his employment, [the Complainant] took leaves of absence in order to process his papers for a possible seaman’s job.
⦁ Moreover, the Company stated that on October 20, 2008, [the Complainant] tendered his resignation and demanded from the Company the payment of his separation pay on account of his long years of service.14 On November 6, 2008 and on November 20, 2008 respectively, he executed and signed a waiver and quitclaim which shows, inter alia, the computation of his receivables. He then signed the voucher for this purpose and thereafter received the check issued to him representing his last pay. Surprisingly, he send a demand letter, through his lawyer, on November 28, 2008, for the payment of P170,000.00 in addition to the amount already received by him. The Company refused to pay him the additional amount for lack of basis in law and in fact.
⦁ [The Complainant] clearly has the burden of proving that he was dismissed by the Company, in light of the Company’s allegation that he resigned voluntarily and was not dismissed. Hence, [the Complainant] must first prove that he was actually dismissed by the Company before the legality of such dismissal can even be raised as an issue.
⦁ However, even a cursory perusal of the evidence on record would show that [the Complainant] failed to prove the fact of dismissal. He relied primarily on his allegations that he was misled by the Company into resigning and that he was actually retrenched. These uncorroborated and self-serving allegations, especially considering the existence of a resignation letter and a quitclaim (both bearing [the Complainant’s] signature), fall short of the evidence required under the law to discharge [the Complainant’s] burden to prove that he was dismissed by the Company.
⦁ To illustrate the aforementioned point, in Gemina, Jr. v. Bankwise, Inc., we ruled that the employee had indeed failed to state circumstances substantiating his claim of constructive dismissal as the employee therein had not claimed to have suffered a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or other benefits. Instead, the said employee only claimed to have been subjected to several acts of harassment by several officers of the employer-company, including being asked to take a forced leave of absence, demanding back the employee’s service vehicle, and delaying the release of employee’s salaries and allowances in order to compel him to quit employment…
See: Original Decision
b. Validity of resignation: on employer
In illegal dismissal cases, when an employer raises the defense of resignation, the burden to establish the voluntariness of such resignation rests on the employer. (Dela Fuente DBA SM Seafood Products v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 214419, 17 November 2021)
Even if the employer claims that the employee resigned, the employer still has the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary. (Pascua v. Bank Wise, Inc., G.R. No. 191460, 31 January 2018)
Dela Fuente DBA SM Seafood Products v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 214419, 17 November 2021, Per Zalameda, J.:
⦁ In the instant case, Gimenez specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of the resignation letter and quitclaim she supposedly signed. Consequently, petitioners bore the burden of proving otherwise, which they utterly failed to do.
⦁ After a meticulous scrutiny of the records, We agree with the CA that the resignation letter and quitclaim are dubious, to say the least. The CA noted several peculiarities and infirmities apparent on the face of the documents:
First, the resignation letter is typewritten, while the Quitclaim is a printed document. It is disturbing to note that such a personal matter as a resignation letter, written by a penurious and uneducated person such as the petitioner, would be neatly done, without corrections, on a typewriter, an instrument which she can ill-afford or which she cannot manage. It is perturbing to note that the reason for the purported resignation coincides with the “hearsay” reason advanced by respondent Sarraga. On the other hand, the quitclaim is a pro-forma printed document.
Second, it is common practice for persons to affix their signatures at or near the last line of the printed text of the document. Petitioner must therefore be presumed to have affixed her signature in accord with common practice. The signature of the petitioner in all the documents on record, except for the questioned documents, confirms this observation. The handwritten name and signature of the petitioner in the two (2) questioned documents appear at the very bottom, of these documents, quite some distance from the last printed/typewritten word/sentence of the document. Petitioner’s signature appearing in the resignation letter is approximately four (4) inches from the last line of the typewritten text. The signature also appears at the extreme lower right corner of the paper while the typewritten words occupy about half thereof. On the other hand, petitioner’s signature in the quitclaim is about two (2) inches from the last line of the printed words. We find it quite unusual, if not contrived, for any person to affix a signature several inches away from the body of the document. At the onset, petitioner had already claimed that she was made to sign blank documents.
Third, if the body of the document is in printed form, the name of the signatory is usually printed so that the signatory will simply affix his/her signature over the printed name. In both documents, the signature of the petitioner was affixed over her handwritten name. It would appear that the name was written after the signature was already made:
Fourth, the handwritten-printed name of the petitioner in both documents appears to have been written by different persons. The handwritten names of the petitioner in the questioned documents does not contain her middle initial “E”, unlike the name she placed in the Complaint, in the verification portion of her petition, she filed before the NLRC. Moreover, the handwritten family name in the resignation letter is spelled “Giminez”, when in all the documents filed by the petitioner, she spells her family name as GIMENEZ. Who would misspell his/her name in a personal document as a resignation letter?
Fifth, and last, the quitclaim and release allegedly signed by the petitioner is in the English language which we seriously doubt is a language known to and understood by the petitioner. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner knows the English language, we seriously doubt that she could have written the same on her own. Furthermore, the quitclaim and release document states “after having been sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say that” but the document was not notarized. How could the petitioner have been sworn to in accordance with law if she did not appear before a person authorized to administer oaths and had subscribed to the said quitclaim?
⦁ With these blatant infirmities appearing on the face of the documents, we are inclined to give credence to the petitioner’s contention that she had previously signed blank papers and the respondents caused the printing of the words on these blank papers after her signature had been procured. Under such circumstances, it is therefore obvious that these documents were not voluntarily signed by the petitioner. She signed the blank papers without the intention of having the same used as a resignation letter and/or quitclaim and release. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
7. Distinguished
a. Voluntary resignation v. Involuntary resignation (constructive dismissal)
Ascent Skills Human Resources Services, Inc. v. Manuel, G.R. No. 249843, October 6, 2021, Per Zalameda, J.:
• In the instant case, the totality of evidence establishes the unfairness and unjustness of respondent’s situation. Considering what respondent went through, the Court agrees that her unbearable condition and environment precipitated her repatriation. The CA’s finding on this is worth quoting:
In filing this labor complaint, petitioner maintained that she was constructively dismissed, citing several circumstances making her continued employment unendurable and unacceptable. She enumerated in detailer her concerns such as (1) she was deployed in Abha not in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; (2) the sexual advances of the male employer unto her including the touching of her breasts and forcing her to touch his private part; (3) her transfer to another employment agency, United Project; (4) she was locked along -with another applicant in a room and were not given water to drink or decent food to eat. To the Court’s mind, these circumstances attributable to private respondents are easily rebuttable. Interestingly, though, neither Ascent Skills Human Resources nor Silver refute these.
Assuming that it was petitioner who refused to be transferred to UPC, her work in Abha, Saudi Arabia, to begin with, was not shown to have been processed through the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). It can be recalled that petitioner was originally deployed to work in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia but was surprised to see her plane ticket indicating that she was going to Abha. Such fact, again, was not denied by private respondents and was corroborated by her own employment contract with Silver. x x x
Petitioner’s assignment as domestic helper in Abha, Saudi Arabia instead of Riyadh as stated in her contract with Silver, was a breach of the original contract approved by the government. Hence, petitioner’s refusal to accept another work from UPC was proper under the circumstances. The Court cannot tolerate this practice as it will open floodgates to even more abuse of our overseas workers in the hands of their foreign employers and recruiters. x x x
• As correctly stressed by the CA, respondent had the right to refuse her employment in Abha. The employment she signed for was in Riyadh. On this score, the NLRC erroneously held that there was no violation of the employment contract since it did not state what city respondent was supposed to work. On the contrary, the employment contract stated the employer’s address to be Riyadh, not elsewhere. Also, Silver Contract’s office was in Riyadh. Clearly, respondent was made to believe that she was bound for Riyadh, not Abha.
• Since Silver Contract could not immediately find the right employment opportunity for the respondent, the least it could do for her was to provide her with appropriate living conditions. Instead, out of spite, Silver Contract placed her in a miserable situation that forced the latter to sever her employment. What Silver Contract did under the circumstances is indubitably tantamount to constructive dismissal. As recently held by the Court, there is constructive dismissal where the employer intentionally places the employee in a situation that will result in the latter being coerced into severing his ties with the former.
See: Original Decision | Case Digest
Pascual v. Sitel Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 240484, March 9, 2020, Per Inting, J.:
• First, the e-mail which petitioner sent to Lee, Sitel’s COO, manifesting his intention to resign categorically and unequivocally expressed his intention to disassociate himself from the company. In the same e-mail, he even asked for: (1) the payment of his salaries, and (2) the issuance of his certificate of employment.
• Petitioner wrote:
This is the most painful decision so far that I have ever made in my life. Farthest from the wildest of my imagination that I will ever have a rendezvous with a very dark chapter of a person’s professional career – BEING LEFT WTH NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO DISASSOCIATE MYSELF FROM EMPLOYMENT WITH SITEL. x x x
x x x x
Truly, I am now in a very discouraged, depressed, exhausted and dejected state emanating from the present inhumane working environment I am being made to suffer. Hence, it FORECLOSES ANY CHOICE BUT FOR ME TO FOREGO CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT WITH SITEL.
The conduct of the following persons toward me have become unbearable already. In consequence, I AM IMPELLED TO GIVE UP MY EIGHT YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT WITH SITEL:
x x x x
• On December 11, 2014, petitioner brought a copy of his resignation letter to Sitel’s operations manager, and asked her to read it and acknowledge its receipt.
• Second, petitioner e-mailed another copy of the resignation letter to Reyes on December 12, 2014 and reiterated his resignation. After that, he sent a hard copy of the resignation letter to the company via registered mail.
• Third, petitioner went back to Sitel on December 18, 2014 with a resignation letter of even date. The following day, Sitel formally accepted his resignation.
• Since petitioner submitted his resignation letter on several occasions, it is incumbent upon him to prove with clear, positive, and convincing evidence that his resignation was not voluntary, but was actually a case of constructive dismissal or that it is a product of coercion or intimidation. He has to prove his allegations with particularity.
• In Pascua v. Bank Wise, Inc., the Court held that an unconditional and categorical letter of resignation cannot be considered indicative of constructive dismissal if it is submitted by an employee fully aware of its effects and implications.
• Similarly, Panasonic v. Peckson, teaches that the Court does not sustain findings of fraud upon circumstances which, at most, create only suspicion; otherwise, it would be indulging in speculations and surmises. Petitioner failed to show any substantial evidence that he was treated unfairly and, thus, he was forced to resign. He failed to show any tangible acts of harassment, insults, and any abuse that would warrant a possible finding of constructive dismissal.
• Here, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, Sitel aptly established that petitioner’s e-mails and resignation letter showed the voluntariness of his separation from the company. While the fact of filing a resignation letter alone does not shift the burden of proof, it is still incumbent upon the employer to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. In petitioner’s case, the facts show that the resignation letter is grounded in petitioner’s desire to leave the company as opposed to any deceitful machination or coercion on the part of Sitel. His subsequent and contemporaneous actions belie the claim that petitioner was subjected to harassment by Sitel…
• Petitioner could not have been coerced as well. Coercion exists when there is a reasonable or well-grounded fear of an imminent evil upon a person or his property or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants. Neither petitioner’s narration of facts prove that he was intimidated. In one case, the Court enumerated the requisites for intimidation to vitiate one’s consent, including: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property.
See: Original Decision | Case Digest
Lagamayo v. Cullinan Group, Inc., G.R. No. 227718, November 11, 2021, Per Lopez, J., J.:
• Constructive dismissal exists as an involuntary resignation on the part of the employee due to the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. An act, to be considered as amounting to constructive dismissal, must be a display of utter discrimination or insensibility on the part of the employer so intense that it becomes unbearable for the employee to continue with his [or her] employment. By definition, constructive dismissal can happen in any number of ways. At its core, however, is the gratuitous, unjustified, or unwarranted nature of the employer’s action. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise, or also known as constructive discharge.
• The nature of constructive dismissal as a dismissal in disguise enables the employers to do away with their obligation to prove just cause and comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing before terminating their employees. Consequently, in the recent case of Jacob v. First Step Manpower Int’l. Services, Inc., the Court held that constructive dismissal is a form of illegal dismissal. Simply put, constructive dismissal results in the employers’ circumvention of the due process requirements of the law in terminating an employee, which effectively undermines their security of tenure.
